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Abstract
Recent development literature has placed priority on poverty reduction, and on possible
growth enhancement from a more equal distribution of assets and income. At the same
time, empirical work consistently shows that economic growth is no more than distribution
neutral. In that context, this paper explores the relationship among growth, inequality and
poverty, and demonstrates the following general conclusions: 1) a redistributive growth
path is always likely to be superior to a distribution neutral path (‘trickle down’) for
reducing poverty; 2) a redistributive growth path is always superior if a country’s per
capita income and inequality are relatively high; and 3) a static redistribution from the rich
to the poor is superior to a redistributive growth path in its effect on poverty for most
countries, but not for all. The paper then considers policy that might be used to make
growth more equitable.
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11. Introduction
In the late 1990s the bilateral and multilateral development agencies came to place
increasing policy emphasis on poverty reduction in developing countries.1 Some agencies
went so far as to establish specific targets for poverty reduction. The achievement of
targets requires policies, and policies are most effective within an overall, coherent
strategy. We argue that the central strategy choice is between poverty reduction through
faster economic growth and reduction through distribution, though the two may be
complementary. This paper develops an analytical framework to consider which of these
would be the most effective in terms of resource allocation, given specific poverty targets,
then proceeds to empirical investigation.
Following this introduction, we review recent literature on growth and distribution, and
suggest that a consensus emerges that discards the previous ‘trade-off’ conclusion. More
and more analysts have moved to the view that an ‘initial condition’ of greater asset and
income equity enhances growth rates. This emerging view allows us to reject concerns that
the redistribution strategy we consider need necessarily undermine poverty reduction in the
long run by reducing per capita growth. The question then becomes, how effective would
redistribution be in reducing poverty? We argue that this will vary by country, and the
analytical framework to assess effectiveness is presented in Section 2. The framework
formulates two abstract possibilities: poverty reduction through distribution-neutral
growth, and poverty reduction through an equal redistribution of each period’s growth
increment. These are compared to a conventional one-off redistribution of current income.
In Section 3, these possibilities are simulated for a large number of countries. The
conclusion is reached that redistribution at the margin is far more effective in poverty
reduction than increases in economic growth that are distribution neutral. In Section 4, the
exercise in simulation is rendered concrete by discussion of specific policies that could be
used to redistribute income, and this is followed by a summary of major conclusions.
2. Growth and distribution
2.1 Inequality and poverty
Of the many issues central to the development process, few have been characterised by the
shifts, reversals and re-affirmations that have pledged the analysis of the interaction of
growth, poverty and inequality. Evidence that inequality and poverty have risen in many
countries in the 1980s and 1990s,2 including some of the OECD countries, rekindled the
ever-smouldering controversies. The mainstream literature has not so much evolved as
1 See, for example, the discussion of targets in DFID 1997). It would appear that there was some controversy
over this emphasis within the World Bank. In June 2000, the convenor of the World Development Report,
Ravi Kanbur, resigned from his participation in the report. Press reports attributed this to internal
disagreements over the relative emphasis to place on growth and redistribution (see The Financial Times, 15
and 16 June 2000).
2 See, De Janvry and Sadoulet (1995), Ravallion and Chen (1997), Flemming (1998), Aghion, et al. (1999),
Cornia (1999), Chu, et al. (1999), McDonald, et al. (1999), Milanovic (1999), and Atkinson (1999).
2fluctuated over the past fifty years.3 It is necessary to revisit the debates, in order to place
the empirical discussion of a subsequent section in context.
From the 1950s into the 1970s emphasis was on probable tradeoffs between growth and
income distribution. This derived in part from the famous ‘inverted U-hypothesis’
(Kuznets 1955), which proposed that inequality rises in the initial phases of development,
then declines after some crucial level is reached. Much research involved estimation of the
so-called turning point (Fields 1980, Chapter 4). Growth theories could be cited that
provided support for this trade-off. Kanbur (1998) and Kanbur and Squire (1999) pointed
out the obvious correspondence between Kuznets’ empirical results and Lewis’ (1954)
labour surplus model. The latter predicts that in a ‘labour surplus’ economy, with
‘unlimited supply of labour’, the profit share would rise relatively to the wage share until
the labour surplus was exhausted. However, theoretical inconsistencies in the Lewis model
undermine this conclusion (Weeks 1971). Other models, as suggested by Aghion, et al.
(1999), might explain a trade off between growth and inequality. For example, Kaldor’s
well known growth model, in which capitalists have higher marginal propensity to save
than workers, implies, as in the Lewis model, that redistribution to profits raises the growth
rate. However, this model is most appropriate for developed countries, in which the
functional distribution of income largely consists of wages and profits, and of less
relevance to developing countries, considered in this paper.
In contrast, work in the 1970s sought to identify redistributive mechanisms for poverty
reduction without hampering growth.4 This was a short-lived focus of the literature,
reversed with the rise of neo-liberalism and the Washington Consensus in the early 1980s.
For the latter, growth itself would be the vehicle for poverty reduction, achieved through
‘trickle down’ mechanisms not always clearly specified. In the 1990s, both the neo-liberal
analysis and the earlier view of a trade-off between growth and equity were challenged by
a number of studies. Accumulating empirical evidence suggested no consistent relationship
among growth, inequality and poverty across countries and over time.5 At the same time,
studies suggested that in many developing countries in Africa, in countries in transition,
and in Latin America stabilization and adjustment policies had an adverse impact on
poverty and inequality, or at best did not improve conditions of the poor (van der Hoeven,
2000). Further, a consensus emerged that the ‘high performing’ Asian countries, prior to
the financial crisis of the late 1990s, combined rapid growth of per capita income with
relatively stable and low inequality (World Bank 1993).
This recent literature that challenges the ‘trade-off’ and ‘trickle down’ approaches has
roots, not always acknowledged, in the brief flowering of pro-distribution arguments of the
1970s. Chenery and Ahluwalia (1974a and 1974b) constructed a model of ‘distribution
with growth’, which distinguished social groups by asset ownership or mode of access to
assets. Growth and distribution were related through ‘income linkages’ between the
groups; i.e., through the labour and commodity markets specified as creating the linkages.
The simulation experiments with this model indicated that redistribution led to substantial
improvement in the incomes of not only poverty groups, but other income groups as well if
3 See Kanbur (1998) for a thorough review.
4 See Chenery, Ahluwalia, et al. (1974).
5 A clear and thorough survey is found on a World Bank website (Ferreira 1999).
3aggregate productivity increased.6 The general thrust of the Chenery and Ahluwalia work
was that poverty constraints growth. The authors summarized the central conclusion of
their work as follows:
If [a poverty group] is provided with an appropriate mix of education, public
facilities, access to credit, land reform, and so forth, investment in the poor can
produce benefits in the form of higher productivity and wages in the organized
sectors, as well as greater output and income for the self-employed poor. In the
short-run, there may be a reduction in the growth of other groups through this re-
direction of investment toward the poor, although this is by no means necessary. In
the long-run, however, it can be argued that the transformation of the poverty
groups into more productive members of society is likely to raise the incomes of
all. (1974a: 47)
Later-day contributions repeat this focus on how inequality and poverty reduce the
capacity for growth, and vice-versa. A distinction is often made between structural and
transient poverty.7 In the case of the former, possible positive effects of growth on poverty
are likely to be limited, especially in the rural sector, by structural and institutional
rigidities, such as the concentration of land ownership. Land reform might eliminate such
constraints and lead to a rise in agricultural productivity and hence growth. If the
productivity of small farms were higher than that of large farms,8 because of disincentives
caused by ownership and the intensity of effort in the small family farms, this would raise
aggregate productivity even more.9 Not withstanding the controversy of the so-called
inverse size rule, statistical exercises, and they are no more than hypothesis tests, indicate
that inequality of land distribution has a negative effect on growth, inequality and
poverty.10 This effect may be due to unspecified political economy factors, rather than
differences in productivity by size.
Transient poverty on the other hand is the outcome of temporary shocks, such as adverse
movements in the terms of trade, crop failures or economic reform policies that lead to
unemployment. However, the distinction between permanent and transient poverty may not
be clear-cut. Households may anticipate moving in and out poverty, and if so may behave
6 Two of the experiments are especially worth noting. In the first, re-distribution to lower income groups
took the form of better nutrition, health, and access to education, which led to an increase in the output-
capital ratio in the sectors using wage labour. In this case, consumption and income of all groups increased
after redistribution. In the second experiment redistribution directly increased the earning capacity of the
poor; e.g. redistribution of the investment share of national income. This simulation led to an increase in the
incomes of and the assets owned by the poor, as well as a substantial increase in the aggregate capital stock
of the economy.
7 See, for example, IFAD (1999), Cornia (1999).
8 The study by Ravallion and Sen (1994), for instance, is based on the hypothesis that small farms are more
productive than large farms.
9 However, the allegation that small farms are more productivity than large units is fraught with analytical
and empirical controversy .A thorough and sceptical review of the debate over the ‘inverse size rule’ is found
in Dyer (1997). See also Platteau (1992).
10 See, for example, Deininger (1999), and Alesina and Rodrik (1994). The work of Ravallion and Sen
(1999) suggest that land transfers reduce the poverty of landless and near-landless households.
4differently from households which are more secure. The precautionary principle may
prompt this ‘transient poor’ not to invest in education, land, and other assets, thus
reinforcing their precarious status. In other words, those households above but near the
poverty line are likely to be a heterogeneous group, consisting of ones who anticipate
permanent rise from poverty, and those fearing a descent into poverty.
Almost by definition the transient poor are those affected by economic cycles and growth.
Much of the work that examined the relationship between growth and income distribution
in the 1990s is basically empirical, with unclear theoretical foundation. Janvry and
Sadoulet (1995) reported that during recessions inequality rises,11 while positive growth
rates are distribution-neutral. Bruno and Ravallion (1998) confirmed that the effect of
growth on inequality is indeterminate, based upon a sample of 45 countries for which at
least four or more surveys were available over a period of at least two decades covering the
1960s into the 1990s. They further concluded that lower initial inequality raises the
likelihood that growth will reduce poverty. As shown in our simulations below, this
conclusion follows almost by definition. Li, Squire, et al. (1998) demonstrated that income
inequality is relatively stable within countries, a confirmation of almost every other cross-
country study, but that it varies significantly among countries. Though obvious as well, the
latter finding indirectly supports the pessimistic conclusion that poverty levels tend to
persist as countries grow.
Of special interest to our study is that empirical work focussed on policy, that considers the
impact of different distributive measures on growth, inequality and poverty. Two points
emerge as important: the form of redistribution, and the cost and the incidence of
redistributive programs. With regard to impact, productivity-raising redistribution ensures,
as shown in the insufficiently appreciated Chenery-Ahluwalia work of the 1970s, that
distribution does not reduce poverty at the expense of growth, and produces sustainable
poverty reduction. That is, those raised from poverty do not regress to their former
deprivation. Enhancing asset ownership for the poor is the clearest way to accomplish this.
Investment in infrastructure, credit targeted to the poor, land redistribution, and education
emerge as important mechanisms to make growth ‘pro-poor’. In the 1990s considerable
stress was placed on education, perhaps because of its non-controversial nature. The
approach was that of a ‘human capital’ framework, which apparently allows the acquisition
of skills to be treat on par with ownership of physical assets. This approach is dubious,
since accumulated education as such cannot be sold by the ‘asset holder’, while land and
other tangible property can. Thus, if a worker loses his or her job during a general fall in
aggregate demand, education provides no asset that can serve as a ‘safety net’ when
sources of livelihood are temporarily lost (i.e., it is not ‘liquid’).
If poverty and inequality have a transitional component, induced by external shocks such
as business cycles and price instability, they will be affected by short-term macro policies.
Particularly controversial are the possible adverse effects of stabilization and structural
adjustment programs on poverty. While some World Bank studies sought to deny the
importance of adverse effects, this sanguine view failed to establish itself.12 In response to
11 This is not a surprising conclusion, since recessions generate unemployment.
12 Referring to adjustment programmes in the sub-Sahara, Demery and Squire concluded, ‘…effective reform
programs are associated with reduced overall poverty, inadequate ones with worsening poverty’ (1996, 40,
italics in original). For a critique, see Weeks (1997), along with their reply (Demery and Squire 1997).
5the controversy over adverse effects of adjustment on the poor, the World Bank and IMF
proposed ‘social safety nets’ and ‘social funds’ in some countries, to target adjustment-
induced poverty, with these programmes typically were designed for a limited period.13 An
evaluation of these social safety nets suggest that these programmes, typically financed by
multilateral lending, had some positive impact on what might be called ‘adjustment losers’,
but did not necessarily reach the poor. Stewart argued that internally funded and locally
designed antipoverty programmes proved more effective in reaching the poor than social
funds (Stewart 1995)
2.2 Methods and incidence of redistribution
If redistribution is used to reduce poverty, then key policy issues are redistribution from
whom, to whom, and by what mechanism, which relate directly to the empirical work of
this paper. The loss and gain of distributive programmes on income groups, and their
reaction to these losses and gains, will depend on the nature of the programme. Similarly,
the administrative burden will vary by programme.
Superficially, land distribution and income distribution would seem to be polar cases. It
might be argued that redistributive land reform, from large landowners to landless peasants
involves a one-off redistribution, which, once achieved, can be left to generate a more
equal distribution and lower poverty levels. On the other hand, a redistribution of income,
without asset redistribution, must be implemented by a continuous application of
progressive taxation and equity-biased public expenditure. In practice, the alternatives are
not so clear-cut. For example, land redistribution unaccompanied by rural development
expenditure might generate a class of poverty-stricken smallholders. Most of the land
redistribution programmes in Latin America, even those that radically changed ownership
patterns (as in Peru), proved in practice to be poverty-generating rather than poverty
reducing (Thiesenhusen 1989). Land redistribution that generates sustainable poverty
reduction may require substantial current expenditure, which in the medium term could
equal or exceed the cost of administering a progressive tax system and pro-poor
distribution of expenditures. Perhaps more importantly, the more equitable land
distribution may prove to be unsustainable in the absence of permanent administrative
restrictions on accumulation of land (ownership ‘ceilings’).
Like land redistribution, progressive taxation would appear to be an obvious vehicle for
redistribution. However, studies of tax incidence and impact have produced mixed
conclusions. Some indicate that progressive taxation is a limited tool for reducing
inequalities in income distribution, as a result of evasion by the rich. A study of Latin
America concluded that tax systems did not contribute significantly to the reduction of
inequality (Alesina 1998). Using a hypothetical data set, Harberger reached the same
conclusion, suggesting that the redistributive effects of progressive and moderate taxation
systems were quite similar (Harberger 1998). As an alternative, he proposed that broadly
based taxes, such as a value added tax, could be modified to increase their equity by
exemptions and exclusions. All such these results are sensitive to the analytical framework
made by each researcher, as can be shown by studies that conclude quite the opposite. For
example, it would appear that the progressivity of income taxes during 1980-1996 in
13 Cornia and Reddy (1999) take issue with the dubious distinction between the ‘adjustment poor’ and
‘chronic poverty’, on analytical and practical grounds.
6Taiwan had ‘positive influence in restricting the expansion of the income gap [between
rich and poor]’ (Jao 2000). A cross-country study of thirty-six developing countries that in
thirteen cases total taxation was progressive, was proportional in seven, and regressive in
six. Income tax systems were progressive in twelve cases out of fourteen (Chu, et al. 1999).
A survey by the ILO reached similar conclusions (ILO 1992).
Revenue raised via progressive taxation can generate a further redistributive impact via
progressive expenditure, depending on targeting or incidence. Empirical work has adopted
either a ‘benefit incidence’ or an ‘expenditure incidence’ approach. Expenditure incidence
examines the effects of public spending on the incomes of the beneficiaries, while benefit
incidence examines the comparative benefits of public goods for intended beneficiaries.
The provision of public goods can be considered progressive if the benefits to the poorest
quintile are larger than for the richest quintile. As an alternative measure, public spending
can be considered progressive if the benefit-income ratio for the poorest quintile is larger
than that for the richest quintile.
The studies of public education typically show that expenditure on primary and secondary
education reduces inequality, and expenditure on tertiary education has a regressive
impact.14 In this context, Alesina maintained that subsidising higher education at the
expense of primary and secondary education reduces the redistributive impact of public
spending, because these subsidies will accrue to the middle or high income. He went
further and argued that most social welfare and benefit programs favour the urban middle
classes, rather than the poor, because provision of social services is more concentrated in
the urban areas. The allegation expenditure on tertiary education is regressive reflects a
partial equilibrium, static perspective. It takes no great insight to point out that the middle
and upper classes in almost every country take advantage of tertiary education, and the
poor do not. This is not a serious argument against public funding of tertiary education, for
the scientists, technicians, even entrepreneurs who will be crucial to growth typically
require university education; i.e., there are externalities to tertiary education. Further, a
university system that is purely privately funded may reinforce the power rigidities that are
the basic cause of inequality. That the poor do not go to universities is no more an
argument against public funding than the absence of the poor from most legal cases is an
argument against public funding of courthouses.
The perceived ineffectiveness of redistributive measures leads some to advocate targeting
public expenditure to the poor, and to judge effectiveness by accuracy of that targeting.15
However, targeting of expenditures in developing countries is fraught with difficulty. Sen
(1995) argued against targeting public spending for several reasons: 1) information
asymmetries reduce the effectiveness of targeting in the presence of ‘cheating’; 2) the
prospect of losing targeted subsidies may reduce beneficiaries’ economic activities;
3) targeting may negatively effect the self-respect of the poor; and 4) the sustainability of
targeted programs is doubtful, as the potential beneficiaries are politically weak. To the list
can be added the formidable measurement problem, which is serious in industrial
countries, and virtually intractable in most developing countries.
14 See, for instance, Chu, et al. (1999), Hammer, et al (1995), Harberger (1998), van de Walle (1995).
15 For example, Milanovic (1995) introduces a concentration coefficient that measures the cumulative rate of
social transfers when recipients are ranked by income. The method of estimation is similar to that of Gini
coefficient.
7Of great practical importance is that targeting involves administrative costs, the burden of
which is a matter of considerable dispute (for example, Kanbur 1998). In a study of thirty
social service programs in Latin America, Grosh (1995) found a trade-off between
administrative costs and the incidence of targeting programs. That is to say, the more
effective the targeting, the greater the cost, implying less expenditure for poverty reduction
as such. Hidden administrative costs can arise from problems of project selection and
execution in the presence of imperfect information (Cornia and Reddy 1999), with a major
difficulty being the identification of the poor. Identification of the poor gives rise to what
might be called the ‘borderline problem’. If one assumes that the poor are identified
accurately and programmes are delivered with equal accuracy, it follows by definition that
the poor just below the borderline will be raised above the non-poor just above it.
Recognition of this possibility by ‘borderline’ households can have a negative incentive
effect.
Targeting public spending is more likely to be effective if the poor are a small proportion
of population; i.e., if poverty is not a major problem. For countries in which poverty is
widespread, the administrative cost, identification, monitoring, and delivery of
programmes may outweigh benefits. This is particularly the case if a country is or recently
has experienced conflict such as civil war. In such countries targeting may serve to
accentuate the tensions that generate conflict, since, by its nature, targeting seeks to
discriminate among segments of the population (Cramer and Weeks 1997).16 This problem
was a major one in the sub-Sahara in the 1990s, where poverty was both widespread and
created or intensified by conflict.
A further strand of theoretical arguments involves so-called political economy arguments
against inequality and, by implication, poverty. This analysis predicts a negative
relationship between income inequality and growth on the grounds that higher initial
inequality would: a) lead to increased public expenditure, because it prompts a demand for
redistributive policies, and b) incite political instability that undermines growth (Alesina
and Rodrik 1994). This excursion into political science is somewhat dubious. For example,
it is not at all clear how a society with the power relationships to generate inequality
would, at the same time, produce an underclass with the political power to force
redistributive policies upon a government (see Cramer 2000). On somewhat firmer
analytical ground, Aghion, et al. (1999) argue that inequality has a negative impact on
growth through imperfect capital markets, to which the poor have limited access. In other
words, if capital markets discriminate against the poor, potentially profitable activities by
the poor are constrained by lack of credit. This position harks back to Chenery, et al.
(1974), in which it was argued that growth would be enhanced if wealth were redistributed
from the rich to the poor, because the marginal productivity of capital is higher for the
poor. The Aghion et al. version adds arguments of ‘moral hazard’ and macroeconomic
stability to the Chenery et al. advocacy of redistribution, to reach much the same
conclusion.
Overall, the pro-redistribution literature of the 1990s was relatively limited in its
theoretical contribution, and most striking in that it demonstrated, yet again, the
16 To take but one example, attempts at identification of the poor by the authorities may be perceived as
having a sinister agenda, identifying the political allegiances of households.
8ambivalence of economists towards the issues of inequality and poverty. On the one hand,
the mainstream literature, with its emphasis upon the efficiency of markets, had a
predilection to view inequality and poverty as accidental or occasional outcomes of a
deregulated growth process. On the other hand, the persistence and severity of poverty in
many, if not most, developing countries brought forth periodic arguments for their
alleviation. The shifts in emphasis in the literature reflect the difficulty of reconciling these
two.
From our review of the literature emerge several important points relevant to the empirical
presentation below. Perhaps the most important is the growing consensus in the literature
that countries with an ‘initial condition’ of relatively egalitarian distribution of assets and
income tend to grow faster than countries with high initial inequality. For our purposes this
is an extremely important conclusion because it means that reducing inequality ‘cuts both
ways’. On the one hand, a growth path characterised by greater equality at the margin
directly benefits the poor in the short run. On the other, the resulting decrease in equality
creates in each period an ‘initial condition’ for the future which is growth enhancing. Thus,
any growth path that reduces inequality deals poverty a double blow: through
redistribution, and through ‘trickle down’.
3 Analytical framework
Income and asset redistribution are not necessary conditions for poverty reduction.
Aggregate growth can also reduce poverty; and, equally, redistribution can achieve poverty
reduction without growth (assuming that a portion of the population has incomes above the
poverty line). To develop a poverty reduction strategy, the central issues are the relative
effectiveness of growth and redistribution, and whether the one enhances each other. It
would seem clear, even on the most superficial analysis, that growth combined with
redistribution would be more effective that either on its own. This truism gives no insight
into the appropriate balance between the two for a concrete poverty target. In order to
determine an appropriate balance, ‘growth’ and ‘redistribution’ must be specified
rigorously. To do this, we begin with a definition. Aggregate GDP in period t is equal to
(1) Yt = Y0(1 + y)t, where y is the growth rate.
We consider the case of t = 1. If we treat each income percentile as a household (implying
zero population growth), and note percentiles by i, distribution-neutral growth of per capita
income for one time period is equal to
(2) Y1 = S Y0i(1 + y), for i = 1 to 100, and y is the growth rate.
We proceed with the fiction that each household is self-employed, and that growth is ruled
by a simple Harrod-Domar equation, so the growth rate is y1i = u 1is1i , where u is the
capital-output ratio and s is the saving and investment rate of the percentile. On the
assumption that the rich have a higher saving and investment propensity than the poor,
ceteris paribus, greater inequality increases the growth rate. This might be called the
‘saving-inequality’ effect. On the other hand, if one assumes that the capital-output ratio is
a negative function of the level of income, ceteris paribus, lower inequality increases the
growth rate. Which outweighs the other is an empirical question, governed by the
elasticities of the saving rate and output-capital ratio with respect to inequality. Formally,
one can write, for any time period, the aggregate growth rate is the product of the
aggregate output capital ratio and the aggregate saving rate.
9(3) y = u s
The aggregate output-capital ratio and the aggregate saving rate are functions of the
distribution of income (G), and other factors that do not concern us here (A
u
and As,
respectively),
(3a) u = u (G, A
u
), u ' < 0,
(3b) s = s(G, As), s’ > 0,
Let e
u
be the elasticity of the output-capital ratio with respect to inequality ([G/ u ] u '), e s the
elasticity of the saving rate with respect to inequality ([G/s]s'), and e g the overall elasticity
of growth with respect to inequality. The effect of a change in inequality on growth are
summarized below. Figure 1 demonstrates the relationships, for the examples of e g = 0,
0.5, and -0.5.
e
u
< e s, then e g > 0, redistribution decreases growth rate ('trade-off between equity and
growth')
e
u
> e s, then e g < 0, redistribution increases growth rate
e
u
= e s, then e g = 0, distribution neutral growth
Figure 1
Alternative growth outcomes when the savings rate and output-capital ration are
functions of degree of inequality
The outcome that characterises a particular country at a particular time is an empirical
question. For example, the impact of redistribution on the output-capital ratio is likely to be
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
Inequality (Gin i coef)
G
DP
gr
o
w
th
ra
te
Es > Eu
Es < Eu
Es = Eu
Equity
decreases
growth
Equity increas es
growth
Dis tribution
neutral
growth
10
substantially growth-increasing in a predominantly agrarian society with agricultural
production concentrated in large, mechanized estates.
Empirical evidence, to which we refer below, consistently indicates that size distributions
of income are quite stable, in the absence of radical changes in institutions and political
power. If it is the case that a country's size distribution were stable over some time period
when aggregate GDP grew at a given rate of ya, it must be the case, defining distributional
stability over percentiles, that,
(4) u isi = ya , for all i.
The output capital ratio falls (rises) to exactly compensate for the rise (fall) in the saving
rate as one moves up (down) the size distribution. Thus, we can ignore variations in u and
s, replace their product with ya, and write, for the primary distribution of income:
(5) Y1 = (1 + ya)S Y0i
At different points in the discussion we call this outcome this ‘distribution-neutral’, ‘trickle
down’, or ‘status quo’ growth. As an alternative, fiscal policy and other measures
discussed below could be used to make growth biased toward a more equal distribution.
Specifically, we consider the case in which the growth generated is equally distributed
absolutely across percentiles. In simple algebra, each percentile receives an income
increment of (Y1 – Y0)/100. This post-transfer or secondary distribution of income is noted
as Yi* for each percentile. After substitution, we can write,
(6) Y1 = (1 + ya)Y0 = S[ Yi*]
Yi* = Y0i + {[(ya)Y0]/100}
This formulation provides a simple, but rigorous definition of growth and redistribution in
the spirit of the Chenery et al., Redistribution with Growth volume of the mid-1970s
(Chenery et al. 1974). The proposed redistribution, equal absolute increments across
percentiles, could be viewed as relatively minimalist. Alternative redistribution rules could
be used, in which the allocation of the growth increment across percentiles were
progressive.
Any change in the primary distribution of income implies a tax. For each percentile
(‘household’), the implicit redistribution tax rate is the following ratio:
(7) Ti = (Y1i - Yi*)/( Y1i - Y0i )
The redistribution tax is negative up to the point of average per capita income (positive
income transfer), then positive above (negative income transfer). If income were normally
distributed, the tax is negative through the fiftieth percentile. It is obvious that the more
unequal the distribution, the lower is the percentile associated with average per capita
income (the fiftieth percentile being the lower bound). Calculated by percentiles, the
redistribution tax is not out of line with rates that have applied in many developed
countries. For example, the extremely unequal Brazilian distribution for the 1990s, with a
Gini coefficient of 60,17 implies a marginal tax rate on the hundredth percentile of slightly
more than eighty percent, well below the maximum ninety-one percent marginal rate in the
United States from World War II until the early 1960s.
17 In this paper Gini coefficients will be reported on a scale of zero to one hundred.
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The proposed marginal redistribution has characteristics that derive automatically from the
nature of income distributions. First, and most obvious, the benefits of the equal absolute
additions to percentile income increase as one moves down the income distribution.
Second, as a result of the first, the lower the poverty line, the greater will be the poverty
reduction. If, as is common, a policy distinction is made between degrees of poverty, with
different poverty lines, the marginal redistribution will reduce ‘severe’ poverty more than
less ‘severe’ poverty. Third, the more unequal the distribution of income below the poverty
line, the less is the reduction in poverty for any increase in per capita income, or
redistribution of that increase.
Before moving to our empirical investigation of alternative growth paths, it is appropriate
briefly to comment on our ‘benchmark’ path, distribution neutral growth. In a recent paper,
Dollar and Kraay (2000) reach the conclusion, based on cross-country regressions, that the
typical outcome of the growth process in developing countries is to leave the income share
of the lowest quintile unchanged; i.e. , distribution-neutral growth. For some reason that is
not clear, the authors characterise this with the phrase, ‘growth is good for the poor’ (italics
in the original).18 This is a rather strange phrase, for it challenges the imagination to
produce any growth pattern that would provoke the converse phrase, ‘growth is bad for the
poor’; i.e., a growth pattern in which the poor become worse off. Strictly speaking, if the
elasticity of the income share of the poor with respect to growth is positive, ‘growth is
good for the poor’. Why an elasticity of unity should be the borderline between growth
being ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for the poor is not clear; indeed, it would seem arbitrary. The policy
issue is not whether growth is or it is not good for the poor (it is except in extraordinary
circumstances), but what policy measures can make it better for the poor.
4. Redistribution with growth: empirical evidence
In this section we inspect the impact on poverty in fifty countries of three simulation
exercises, corresponding to different distributional outcomes: 1) a one percent distribution-
neutral increase in per capita GDP; 2) a one percent increase in per capita GDP, distributed
equally across income percentiles; and 3) a one percent redistribution of income from the
richest twenty percent to the poorest twenty percent. The effectiveness of the outcomes in
reducing poverty is judged by the time period required to achieve a given target.
The necessary condition for a country to be included in the simulations is that there were
statistics on the income share for quintiles,19 and that the country was included in the
World Bank’s estimate of absolute poverty. The World Bank estimates were generated by
converting each country’s per capita income to constant US dollars for a base year, then
setting a poverty line of US$1 a day.20 The specified poverty percentile for one dollar a
day is implied by the assumptions made about the distribution of income within each
quintile. To estimate the impact of a change in income on the percentage of households in
18 The same point, that distribution neutral growth appears to be the norm, is demonstrated empirically in a
much simpler way and with less fanfare in Ferreira (1999).
19 The major source was the WIDER income distribution database. See appendix for details by country.
20 The World Bank also provides estimates of the population below two dollars day, but this measure is not
used here.
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poverty, it is necessary to make explicit the implicit intraquintile distribution of income. It
was not necessary to know the intraquintile distribution for all quintiles, only for the
quintile in which the poverty line fell, before and after the three simulations. The method
of estimating intraquintile distribution is explained in the data appendix. Our assumption is
that in the relevant quintiles mean and median income are equal.
Table 1
Poverty levels by Gini coefficient and poverty line, estimated (underlined) and from
functional form, fifty countries
Gini coef: 20 to 29 30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 and above
Pov. line, % of PCY:
10 to 19 .7 .7 5.6
.5 .8 4.8
20 to 29 .7 2.7 7.7 18.6 23.2
.7 2.6 7.1 18.8 25.4
30 to 39 9.0 27.8 33.0 41.0
9.7 27.5 33.9 41.5
40 to 49 3.6 15.5 28.6 50.5
15.1 29.1 48.9
50 to 59 12.8 31.7 48.0 48.7
32.0 48.3 51.0
60 to 69 17.9 54.5
17.0 54.6
70 and 47.2 50.7 77.9
above 47.0 50.4 75.0
Source: authors’ estimates based on the World Bank poverty estimates and World Income Inequality
Database (WIID).
Note: the underlined numbers are the estimated one dollar poverty percentages from Table 2. The number
below these is the poverty level generated from the functional relationship, Pi = P(Gi, pi) where P is the poverty
percentage, G the Gini coefficient, p the poverty line as a percentage of per capita income, and i the country.
The functional form is found in van der Hoeven (2000: 15-17), with a numerical example. The two measures
are not the same due to differences across countries in the intraquintile distribution of income. Empty cells
indicate no observations among the fifty countries.
For an absolute poverty line, one US dollar per day in this case, the percentage of
households in poverty is strictly determined by per capita income and the degree of
inequality. This is demonstrated in Table 1. Moving vertically down the table, the poverty
line rises as a percentage of GDP; and moving across, the Gini coefficient rises. On the
assumption of a continuous distribution function, such as a lognormal function with a
given variance and a poverty line expressed as a fraction or multiple of the mean (van der
Hoeven 2000), one can generate the implied percentage of households in poverty. In the
table these are the lower numbers in each cell, calculated by substituting the country’s Gini
coefficient and per capita income into the lognormal distribution. Since these numbers are
generated from a continuous distribution function the intraquintile distribution of income
for the poverty quintiles is given by the overall distribution function. The upper numbers
in each cell, underlined, are the poverty percentages of the World Bank. For cells with
more than one country, the simple average of poverty percentages is used. The table shows
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that in most cases the poverty figures generated by the lognormal distribution, with the
appropriate Gini coefficient and per capita income figures, compare reasonably well with
the ‘actual’ estimates of the World Bank.
Prior to presenting the simulation results, brief commentary is necessary on the particular
definition we use for poverty reduction. Throughout the discussion, different growth and
distribution scenarios will be assessment by their effectiveness in moving households out
of poverty; that is, moving households from below to above the poverty line. This
definition has two advantages. First, it corresponds to the poverty reduction targets of
multilateral and bilateral donors. Second, and no doubt related to the first, it is easily
calculated and compared across countries. However, it has a serious drawback, in that it
excludes the improvement for all households whose incomes do not rise above the poverty
line. This drawback of the approach becomes especially serious for comparing different
growth scenarios when considering low-income countries.
Table 2 provides the basic statistics for the simulation exercises for the fifty countries: per
capita income,21 the Gini coefficient, and the percentage of the population with income per
head below one US dollar (the poverty line), as estimated by the World Bank. In Table 3,
the results of the simulations are given, for the two growth exercises, distribution-neutral
growth (DNG in the table) and equal distribution growth (EDG). Columns one and two
report the estimates of the percentile of households lifted out of US one dollar poverty as
the result of one percent growth, distribution-neutral and equal-distribution, respectively.
Column three reports the ‘efficiency of redistribution’ ratio. This is defined as the ratio of
poverty reduction for equal distribution growth to distribution-neutral growth (column 1
divided by column 2). This ratio is greater than unity for forty-seven of the fifty countries.
That is, for ninety-four percent of the countries, the equal distribution grow strategy
reduces poverty more in a given time period than a distribution-neutral growth strategy.
This in itself is not surprising, for distribution-neutral growth is only more effective in
reducing poverty for countries with 50 percent or more of the population below the poverty
line. Given our criterion of one dollar a day these countries belong to the group with a very
low per capita income. It is surprising how much more effective equally distributed growth
proves to be in reducing poverty for most countries. For a large proportion of the countries,
the ratio is in excess of three; i.e. , equal distribution growth raises three times as many
households from poverty than distribution neutral growth over any time period.
Inspection of the efficiency ratios reveals the obvious point that the benefits of equal
distribution growth are greater the higher is a country’s per capita income, and the higher
its Gini coefficient. The two together account for about sixty percent of the variation in the
efficiency ratio, with most of the remainder explained by the distribution of income within
the quintile in which the poverty level falls. The results imply that growth with
redistribution would be particularly appropriate for the Latin American countries and those
of North Africa and the Middle East. Its poverty reducing advantage would be less for the
sub-Saharan countries (except South Africa), because of their low per capita incomes. It
would also be less effective for the former centrally planned countries, despite their
middle-income status, because of their relatively low inequality.
21 Given the distribution of income by quintiles and the intra-quintile distribution for the quintile in which
the poverty level falls, a unique per capita income is implied. If the World Bank source gave a per capita
other than this, the implied value was used in the table.
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Table 2
Distribution and poverty statistics for fifty countries, 1980s and 1990s
Country by Region PCY Gini coeff Poverty: % of pop US$1
Latin America (12) 1391 53.5 26.0
Brazil 1995 1870 60.1 23.2
Chile 1992 1585 50.7 15.0
Colombia 1991 2400 57.2 7.8
Costa Rica 1989 1350 42.0 19.0
Dom. Rep 1989 1390 50.5 19.9
Ecuador 1994 860 43.0 30.6
Guatemala 1989 658 59.1 53.5
Honduras 1992 660 52.6 46.7
Mexico 1992 1620 50.3 14.9
Nicaragua 1993 685 50.3 43.8
Panama 1989 1560 56.5 26.0
Venezuela 1990 2050 53.8 11.9
N Africa and ME (5) 1563 44.0 3.0
Algeria 1995 1757 35.3 0.8
Egypt 1991 905 32.0 7.6
Jordan 1992 1700 40.7 2.4
Morocco 1991 1845 39.2 0.8
Tunisia 1990 1610 40.2 3.6
Sub-Sahara (13) 746 51.1 46.5
Botswana 1986 1062 54.2 33.0
Guinea 1991 1073 46.8 27.0
Kenya 1992 750 57.5 50.5
Lesotho 1987 675 56.0 48.7
Madagascar 1993 300 46.0 73.8
Mauritania 1988 690 42.4 31.7
Niger 1992 390 36.1 61.2
Nigeria 1993 840 45.0 31.1
Rwanda 1984 445 28.9 46.5
Senegal 1991 545 53.8 54.5
South Africa 1993 1740 62.3 23.2
Zambia 1993 210 46.2 82.0
Zimbabwe 1990 977 56.8 41.0
Asia, not FSU (8) 1000 40.3 21.7
China 1995 972 41.5 22.7
India 1992 460 32.0 47.9
Indonesia 1996 890 36.5 7.9
Nepal 1996 437 36.7 50.7
table continues…
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Country by Region PCY Gini coeff. Poverty: % of pop US$1
Pakistan 1991 850 31.2 11.8
Philippines 1994 862 42.9 26.6
Sri Lanka 1990 962 30.1 4.0
Thailand 1992 2570 51.5 1.8
Former CP (12) 1249 33.1 5.9
Belarus 1993 1415 21.6 0.5
Bulgaria 1992 1050 30.8 2.7
Czech Rep 1993 780 26.6 3.6
Hungary 1993 1520 27.9 0.6
Kazakhstan 1993 1900 32.7 0.7
Kyrgyzstan Rep 1993 881 35.3 18.9
Lithuania 1993 1558 33.6 0.7
Moldova 1992 1233 34.4 6.7
Romania 1992 680 25.5 17.8
Russian Fed 1993 1965 31.0 0.7
Slovak Rep 1992 531 27.7 12.8
Turkmenistan 1993 1480 35.8 4.6
Source: see Table 1.
Notes: PCY, per capita income in indicated year; poverty measured as percent of population.
As the poverty line rises up a country’s income distribution, the efficiency of redistribution
ratio becomes less and less sensitive to measures of inequality. However, it is always the
case, no matter what a country’s per capita income or degree of inequality,22 that
redistribution with growth is more efficient than distribution neutral growth in reducing the
intensity poverty. This is because the relative benefit of equal distribution growth increases
as one moves down the income distribution, independently of a country’s per capita
income or degree of inequality.
As discussed above, the redistribution with growth outcome implies a tax on all households
whose income is above the mean. In which percentile the mean falls depends on the
skewedness of the overall income distribution. The final two columns (columns 4 and 5) of
Table 3 report the implied tax rate for the highest percentile, and the average rate across all
percentiles whose income is redistributed towards the poorer percentiles. This is a
marginal rate, referring to the increase or growth increment in per capita income.
Inspection of the table shows, as expected, the maximum and average rates are positively
correlated with the Gini coefficient. Whether the implicit tax rates should be judged as high
depends on the mechanism to bring about the outcome. If distribution-neutral growth
represents the primary (pre-tax) outcome, and equal-distribution growth the secondary
(post-tax) outcome, then there is a straight-forward disincentive effect for those taxed, to
be weighted against the incentive effect of the beneficiaries. We make the reasonable
assumption that if positive tax rates create a disincentive to earn further income, then
negative tax rates create an incentive to earn income and contribute to higher national
22 That is, for any distribution that is not equal.
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growth. If the income distribution is skewed, then the number of households enjoying and
incentive to earn will out number those suffering a disincentive, and the impact on growth
should be positive.
Table 3
Impact of two growth patterns on poverty, fifty countries
Percentile raised from
poverty
Efficiency of
RedisY
Redistribution Tax
Rates
Country by region DNG 1% EDG 1% ratio 100th pctl Average
Latin America (12) .32 1.11 3.86 77.7 45.0
Brazil 1995 .24 1.28 5.33 82.0 38.6
Chile 1992 .28 1.20 4.29 77.6 38.6
Colombia 1991 .20 1.36 6.80 76.4 40.3
Costa Rica 1989 .27 .98 3.63 71.8 44.3
Dom. Rep 1989 .35 1.34 3.83 76.7 41.6
Ecuador 1994 .51 1.08 2.12 75.2 39.2
Guatemala 1989 .46 .83 1.80 81.7 38.0
Honduras 1992 .41 .75 1.83 79.3 50.1
Mexico 1992 .31 1.41 4.55 76.5 52.1
Nicaragua 1993 .38 .70 1.84 77.3 50.5
Panama 1989 .17 .77 4.53 79.1 54.1
Venezuela 1990 .29 1.67 5.76 78.9 52.1
N Africa and ME (5) .23 .82 3.52 67.6 43.0
Algeria 1995 .01 .03 3.00 64.7 38.2
Egypt 1991 .55 1.37 2.49 63.7 35.2
Jordan 1992 .30 1.39 4.63 72.6 47.9
Morocco 1991 .01 .03 3.00 69.3 47.3
Tunisia 1990 .28 1.26 4.50 67.5 46.5
Sub-Sahara (13) .46 .87 2.05 74.3 46.8
Botswana 1986 .40 1.13 2.83 79.1 40.2
Guinea 1991 .20 .59 2.95 72.9 43.6
Kenya 1992 .50 .94 1.88 82.4 50.5
Lesotho 1987 .37 .69 1.86 79.2 52.3
Madagascar 1993 .24 .20 .83 72.6 43.6
Mauritania 1988 .44 .84 1.91 69.1 48.4
Niger 1992 .87 .93 1.07 64.9 43.6
Nigeria 1993 .40 .95 2.38 71.0 50.8
Rwanda 1984 .90 1.10 1.22 59.0 38.8
Senegal 1991 .75 1.13 1.51 78.8 50.4
South Africa 1993 .30 1.48 4.93 82.1 52.7
Zambia 1993 .24 .14 .58 73.0 42.0
table continues…
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Percentile raised from
poverty
Efficiency of
RedisY
Redistribution Tax
Rates
Country by region DNG 1% EDG 1% ratio 100th pctl Average
China 1995 .37 .99 2.68 69.7 44.4
India 1992 .78 .99 1.27 62.3 41.7
Indonesia 1996 .52 1.27 2.44 62.3 41.7
Nepal 1996 1.00 .94 .94 66.1 39.2
Pakistan 1991 .47 1.11 2.36 61.8 42.3
Philippines 1994 .40 .96 2.40 73.0 48.9
Sri Lanka 1990 .51 1.35 2.65 61.8 40.8
Thailand 1992 .31 .79 2.55 79.0 51.5
Former CP (12) .29 .67 2.19 57.2 37.1
Belarus 1993 .01 .01 1.00 49.3 28.8
Bulgaria 1992 .30 .86 2.87 48.8 27.2
Czech Rep 1993 .70 1.50 2.14 56.6 30.3
Hungary 1993 .01 .01 1.00 59.6 39.8
Kazakhstan 1993 .01 .02 2.00 61.7 34.0
Kyrgyzstan Rep 1993 .37 .90 2.43 64.1 45.5
Lithuania 1993 .01 .02 2.00 65.0 43.6
Moldova 1992 .34 1.18 3.47 63.1 44.5
Romania 1992 .45 .84 1.87 56.2 37.5
Russian Fed 1993 .01 .02 2.00 57.5 41.9
Slovak Rep 1992 1.00 1.46 1.46 39.3 27.0
Turkmenistan 1993 .30 1.22 4.07 64.9 45.5
Source: see Table 1.
Notes: Efficiency of RedisY (efficiency of redistributive growth) is the ratio of EDG to NDG. The average
redistribution tax rate is the rate across percentiles with positive tax rates.
These growth simulations can be compared to the more conventional exercise, a direct
redistribution from the rich to the poor. This redistribution is simulated in Table 4, where it
is assumed that one percentage point of total national income is shifted from the top
quintile to the bottom quintile, and distributed equally among those households.23 The
table shows for each country the reduction in the poverty measure for the one percent
redistribution in column two, and can be compared to column three in Table 2, where
preredistribution poverty is given. The outcome is summarized in column three of Table 4,
which reports the percentage reduction in poverty as the result of the redistribution. For
example, preredistribution poverty in Brazil was measured as 23.2 percent of the
population, and is simulated to be 18.4 percent after redistribution, for a fall of 20.7 percent
(4.8 percentage points). The final column of the table gives the implicit taxes rate on the
highest twenty percentile resulting from the redistribution. These prove to be quite low,
varying from less than two percent to a high of three percent, inversely related to inequality
(i.e. , the share of preredistribution income accruing to the top quintile).
23 At the poverty boundary, this redistribution shifts some households above the ones with slightly higher
pre-redistribution incomes, but this does not affect the conclusions reached in the text.
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Table 4
Impact of income redistribution on poverty by country
Country by Region Poverty after RY
% pop
Pov. Red
(% initial level)
Tax rate,
top quintile, %
Latin America (12) 21.9 29.1 1.8
Brazil 1995 18.4 20.7 1.6
Chile 1992 8.7 41.9 1.8
Colombia 1991 1.0 87.3 1.8
Costa Rica 1989 14.4 24.0 2.0
Dom. Rep 1989 14.0 29.7 1.8
Ecuador 1994 30.6 0.2 1.9
Guatemala 1989 53.4 0.1 1.6
Honduras 1992 46.6 0.2 1.8
Mexico 1992 7.1 52.3 1.8
Nicaragua 1993 43.4 0.8 1.8
Panama 1989 23.9 8.1 1.7
Venezuela 1990 1.9 84.1 1.7
N Africa and ME (5) 0.8 55.0 2.2
Algeria 1995 0.6 25.0 2.3
Egypt 1991 1.0 87.4 2.4
Jordan 1992 0.8 65.1 2.1
Morocco 1991 0.6 22.1 2.2
Tunisia 1990 0.9 75.2 2.2
Sub-Sahara (13) 45.8 2.5 1.9
Botswana 1986 32.9 0.3 1.7
Guinea 1991 25.8 4.3 2.0
Kenya 1992 50.4 0.1 1.6
Lesotho 1987 48.7 0.0 1.7
Madagascar 1993 73.8 -0.1 1.9
Mauritania 1988 31.1 2.0 2.2
Niger 1992 61.1 0.2 2.3
Nigeria 1993 31.1 0.1 2.0
Rwanda 1984 46.4 0.3 2.6
Senegal 1991 53.4 1.9 1.7
South Africa 1993 17.8 23.1 1.5
Zambia 1993 82.3 -0.3 2.0
Zimbabwe 1990 41.0 0.1 1.6
Asia, not FSU (8) 18.8 37.4 2.2
China 1995 19.4 14.5 2.1
India 1992 47.8 0.1 2.4
Indonesia 1996 1.0 87.7 2.2
table continues…
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Country by Region Poverty after RY
% pop
Pov. Red
(% initial level)
Tax rate,
top quintile, %
Nepal 1996 50.3 0.8 2.2
Pakistan 1991 5.3 55.0 2.5
Philippines 1994 25.0 6.1 2.0
Sri Lanka 1990 0.9 77.3 2.5
Thailand 1992 0.7 57.7 1.7
Former CP (12) 3.2 41.8 2.6
Belarus 1993 0.5 0.0 3.0
Bulgaria 1992 0.9 66.3 2.6
Czech Rep 1993 0.9 74.9 2.7
Hungary 1993 0.5 16.7 2.6
Kazakhstan 1993 0.6 21.4 2.5
Kyrgyzstan Rep 1993 15.1 20.2 2.4
Lithuania 1993 0.6 16.7 2.4
Moldova 1992 1.0 85.7 2.4
Romania 1992 14.1 20.7 2.9
Russian Fed 1993 0.5 23.1 2.6
Slovak Rep 1992 3.1 75.8 2.8
Turkmenistan 1993 0.9 80.4 2.3
Source: see Table 1.
Notes: RY - redistribution of income of one percentage point from highest to lowest quintile. Pov Red - poverty
reduction from initial (preredistribution) level of poverty. One percent of national income redistributed from the
top 20 percent to the bottom 20 percent.
Inspection of Table 4 shows that the poverty reductions associated with redistribution
without growth vary dramatically across countries. In general, the lower the per capita
income of a country, the less is the poverty reduction, demonstrated most obviously for the
twelve Latin American countries, among which the reduction for the Central American
states and Ecuador is virtually nil. The other obvious influence is inequality. The lower the
inequality, holding per capita income constant, the greater the poverty reduction from a
redistribution, because those below the poverty line are ‘packed’ close together.
Comparing the middle-income Latin American countries to the former centrally planned
countries reveals this.
These results suggest a typology of countries differentiated by the general strategy that is
most conducive to poverty reduction, and this is done in Table 5. In this table, we calculate
in columns two and three the number of years required for distribution-neutral growth and
equal distribution growth to achieve the same poverty reduction as a transfer of one percent
of national income from the highest to the lowest quintile. To take the first country,
Venezuela, as an example, neutral distribution growth would require over thirty-four years
to reduce poverty by the same amount as the one percentage point redistribution, and equal
distribution growth would require six years. On the basis of these calculations, the fifty
countries fall into three categories. In category 1, the ‘income redistribution countries’,
both growth strategies require more than one year to reduce poverty as much as a straight
redistribution. The countries are listed in descending order of the number of years required
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for distribution-neutral growth to match the impact of the one percent redistribution on
poverty. For thirty-four of the fifty countries (sixty-eight percent), straight redistribution is
the most effective method of poverty reduction.
Table 5
Growth equivalents of one percent redistribution from highest to lowest quintile
Country by Most Effective Policy Years to reduce poverty as much
as 1% redistribution
DNG 1% EDG 1%
A. Income Redistribution Countries (30)
1 Venezuela 1990 34.4 6.0
2 Colombia 1991 34.1 5.0
3 Mexico 1992 25.1 5.5
4 Algeria 1995 20.0 6.7
5 Brazil 1995 20.0 3.8
6 South Africa 1993 17.9 3.6
7 Morocco 1991 17.0 5.7
8 Dom. Rep 1989 16.9 4.4
9 Russian Fed 1993 15.0 7.5
10 Kazakhstan 1993 15.0 7.5
11 Panama 1989 12.4 2.7
12 Turkmenistan 1993 12.3 3.0
13 Egypt 1991 12.1 4.8
14 Lithuania 1993 12.0 6.0
15 Hungary 1993 10.0 10.0
16 Tunisia 1990 9.8 2.2
17 Bulgaria 1992 6.0 2.1
18 Jordan 1992 5.2 1.1
19 Philippines 1994 4.1 1.7
20 Czech Rep 1993 3.9 1.8
21 Thailand 1992 3.3 1.3
22 Mauritania 1988 1.4 0.7
23 Chile 1992 22.5 5.2
24 Costa Rica 1989 16.9 4.6
25 Moldova 1992 16.9 4.9
26 Kyrgyzstan Rep 1993 10.4 4.3
27 Romania 1992 8.2 4.4
28 China 1995 8.9 3.3
29 Sri Lanka 1990 6.1 2.3
30 Guinea 1991 5.8 2.0
31 Pakistan 1991 13.8 5.8
table continues…
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32 Indonesia 1996 13.4 5.5
33 Slovak Rep 1992 9.7 6.6
34 Senegal 1991 1.4 0.9
B. Equal Distribution Growth Countries (13) Efficiency Ratio
35 Botswana 1986 0.3 0.1 2.83
36 Zimbabwe 1990 0.1 0.0 2.69
37 Nigeria 1993 0.1 0.0 2.38
38 Ecuador 1994 0.1 0.1 2.12
39 Lesotho 1987 0.0 0.0 1.86
40 Kenya 1992 0.1 0.1 1.88
41 Nicaragua 1993 0.9 0.5 1.84
42 Honduras 1992 0.2 0.1 1.83
43 Guatemala 1989 0.2 0.1 1.80
44 India 1992 0.1 0.1 1.27
45 Rwanda 1984 0.1 0.1 1.22
46 Niger 1992 0.1 0.1 1.07
47 Belarus 1993 0.0 0.0 1.00
C. Distribution-Neutral Growth Countries (3)
48 Nepal 1996 0.4 0.4 .94
49 Madagascar 1993 neg. neg. .83
50 Zambia 1993 neg. neg. .58
Source: see Table 1.
Notes: Criteria for policy categories:
1.) Income redistribution: The poverty reduction achieved by a one percent redistribution requires more than
one year of distribution-neutral and equal-distribution growth.
2.) Equal distribution growth: EDG in one year reduces poverty more than either redistribution or distribution-
neutral growth.
3.) Distribution-neutral growth: DNG reduces poverty in one year more than redistribution or EDG.
In category 2 are thirteen ‘redistribution with growth’ countries, for which redistribution is
not the most effective poverty reduction strategy, and equal distribution growth is more
effective than distribution-neutral growth. For these countries one or both of the growth
strategies at least matches the redistribution poverty reduction in less than a year, and the
time period for equal distribution growth is the shorter. The latter point is emphasised by
inclusion of the ‘efficiency ratio’ a final column, taken from Table 3. These countries are
characterised either by low per capita income or relatively equal distribution (or some
combination of the two). Finally, there is category 3, the three ‘trickle down’ countries, for
which growth as such is the most effective vehicle for poverty reduction. The defining
characteristic of the trickle down countries is that they have more than fifty percent of their
population in poverty as a result of their low per capita income. However, it does not
follow that all low income countries would fall into this category. If low income is
combined with a relatively equal distribution, as for Niger, equal distribution growth may
be more effective in reducing poverty, if only marginally so.
Thus, the simulation exercises demonstrate that for the overwhelming majority of middle-
income countries, poverty reduction is most effectively achieved by a redistribution of
current income. For these same countries, redistribution with growth would be the second-
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best option, and distribution-neutral, or status quo growth, a poor third. Low-income
countries require a growth strategy, and for most redistribution with growth would be more
effective than status quo growth. With these generalizations in mind, we consider poverty
reduction policies in the following section.
5. Conditions for policies for redistribution with growth
The major element required to introduce and effectively implement a redistributive strategy
in any country is the construction of a broad political coalition for poverty reduction. The
task of this coalition would be the formidable one of pressuring governments for
redistribution policies, on the one hand, while neutralising opposition to those policies
from groups whose self-interest rests with the status quo. How such a political coalition
might come about is beyond the scope of this paper. We focus on a less fundamental, but
crucially practical issue: the policies that could bring about a redistribution strategy. To be
policy relevant, our consideration of redistribution mechanisms must move beyond a
listing of possibilities to an analysis of the likely effectiveness of these.
Perhaps the most important determinant of the effectiveness of the various measures and
specifics of each redistribution strategy is the structure of an economy. This structure will
depend on the level of development, which will to a great extend condition the country’s
production mix, the endowments of socio-economic groups, the remuneration to factors,
direct and indirect taxes on income and assets, prices paid for goods and services, and
transfer payments. These elements of the distribution system are initial conditions that
delineate the scope for redistributive policies. In this analytical context, the implementation
requirements of redistributive policies summarized in a simple theoretical framework (see
Hamner et al. 1997). First, define the following terms: Y denotes the income of a
household, V is transfer payments, T is taxes, k is a vector of assets (including human
capital), w is a vector of rates of return (including wages), p is the price vector of those
goods and services, q is the vector of goods and services purchased by the household, and
S is household saving. Then, by definition it follows:
Y = (V – T) + wk = pq + S
Transfer payments
(unemployment
compensation,
pensions, child
benefits, aid to
disabled) and
progressive taxes
(on income and
wealth)
Effective in middle-
income countries
Minimum wages,
low-wage subsidies,
other labour market
regulations, public
employment
schemes (w); credit
programmes for the
poor; land reform,
education (k);
Some effective in
low-income
countries
Subsidies for basic
needs goods, public
sector infra-
structure investment
(p); child nutrition
programmes (q)
Effective in most
countries
Facilitate future
asset acquisition:
‘village banks’ and
other financial
services for the poor
Effective in most
countries
The effectiveness of tax and expenditure policies (V and T) to generate secondary and
tertiary distributions more equitable than the primary distribution depends upon the relative
importance of the formal sector. All empirical evidence shows that the formal sector wage
bill and profit share increase with the level of development. It is wage employment and
corporate profits to which governments can most effectively apply progressive taxation.
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Along with the importance of the formal sector goes a high degree of urbanization, and
working-poor urban households are more easily targeted than either the rural poor or urban
informal sector households. The experience of a number of middle-income countries has
demonstrated the effectiveness of basic income payments for poverty reduction, with an
effective example being the basic pension paid to the elderly in South Africa.24
As shown in the previous section, the redistribution strategy is most appropriate for
middle-income countries, because their per capita incomes are high relatively to the
absolute poverty line. These are also the countries whose economic structures make
taxation and expenditure instruments effective for redistribution. Thus, the thirty-seven
‘income redistribution’ countries, and others at similar levels of development, qualify for
the redistributive strategy both in terms of its intrinsic effectiveness and the institutional
capacity to implement it. Such countries would include the larger ones in Latin America
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela), several Asian countries (the Republic of
Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia), and virtually all of the former socialist countries of
Central and Eastern Europe.
To a certain extent, specific economic structures allow for effective use of taxation for
redistribution in a low-income country that would typically be relevant only for middle-
income countries. If the economic of a low-income country is dominated by petroleum or
mineral production, then a large portion of national income may be generated by modern
sector corporations. This allows for effective taxation even though administrative capacity
of the public sector may be limited. The tax revenue can be redistributed through poverty-
reduction programmes, though not through transfer payments if the labour force is
predominantly rural. Examples of mineral-rich low-income countries with the potential to
have done this, albeit unrealised, were Nigeria (oil), Liberia (bauxite), and Zambia
(copper).
Interventions to change the distribution of earned income (wk in the equation above),
which in effect alter market outcomes, will also tend to be more effective in middle-income
countries. The most common intervention is a minimum wage, though there are many other
policies to improve earnings from work (see Rogers 1995). Other mechanisms include
public employment schemes and tax subsidies to enterprises to hire low-wage labour. It is
unlikely that any of these would be effective in low-income countries, because of
enforcement problems (minimum wage), targeting difficulties (employment schemes), and
narrowness of impact (wage subsidies).
Land reform might achieve poverty reduction for rural households, but the relationship
between land redistribution and level of development is a complex one. On the one hand,
low-income countries are predominantly rural, so if land ownership is concentrated, its
redistribution could have a substantial impact on poverty. Further, the more
underdeveloped a country, the less commercialized tend to be poor rural households.
Therefore, the benefits to the poor from land redistribution in low-income countries are
less likely to be contingent on support services. On the other hand, lack of administrative
capacity and so-called traditional tenure systems represent substantial constraints to land
redistribution in many low-income countries, and especially in the sub-Saharan countries.
24 While relatively low, the pension in the 1990s was an important income source for the rural poor,
especially for female-headed households (see Standing, Sender and Weeks 1996, Chapter 6).
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The usual approach to land redistribution presupposes private ownership, such that it is
clear from whom the land will be taken and to whom it will be given. There are few sub-
Saharan countries in which private ownership is widespread, making redistribution difficult
or impossible without prior clarification of ownership claims (Platteau 1992, 1995). While
land redistribution is probably not an effective poverty reducing measure for most low-
income countries, a few notable exceptions in Asia (e.g., India and Vietnam), suggest that
it should not be ruled out in all cases.
For middle-income countries, experience in Latin America has shown that governments
can effectively implement a land redistribution. However, the high degree of
commercialization of agriculture in middle-income countries requires that redistribution be
complemented by a range of rural support services, including agricultural extension,
marketing facilities, and other measures. Perhaps more serious, the relevance of land
reform for poverty reduction tends to decline as countries develop and the rural population
shrinks relatively and absolutely. For example, at the end of the twentieth century in the
five most populous Latin American countries, barely twenty percent or less of the labour
force was in agriculture. Further, when seeking to reduce poverty among the landless and
near-landless in such countries, minimum wages may be more relevant than land
redistribution. These considerations suggest that while land redistribution may be an
effective and feasible mechanism for some countries, other mechanisms may be more
effective in both low- and middle-income countries.
Interventions that directly affect the prices and access to goods and services (pq) could
potentially be quite powerful instruments for poverty reduction. Public subsidies to
selected basic consumer products have the administrative advantage of not requiring
targeting, only identification of those items that carry a large weight in the expenditure of
the poor. Multilateral adjustment programmes typically require an end to such subsidies on
grounds of allocative efficiency or excessive budgetary cost. However, among multilateral
agencies there is no consensus on subsidies. The rules of the World Trade Organization do
not prohibit consumer subsidies, as long as they do not discriminate between domestic
production and imported substitutes (FAO 1998). Whether subsidies would generate
excessive fiscal strain would depend on their extent and how they were financed. Again,
the level of development of a country is of central importance for the effectiveness of
subsidies. In low-income countries with the majority of the poor in the countryside,
consumer subsidies are unlikely to have a significant impact on the poor outside urban
areas. Basic goods provision in kind can be an effective instrument for poverty reduction
even in very low-income countries, by delivering such items as milk to school children. To
do so with a non-targeted programme would require a progressive tax system, which would
be more likely in a middle-income country, as discussed above.
The poor in all countries suffer from poor health and inadequate education relatively to the
non-poor. Education and health have two great practical advantages for poverty reduction:
1) the programmes that would help the poor are easily identified (though the specifics
would vary by country); and 2) unlike for asset or income redistribution, their provision to
the poor is not controversial at the rhetorical level. Provision of health care and education
that would improve the lives of the poor requires skilled workers. Since these workers
would be in short supply in the public sector, effective provision might necessitate either
their reallocation from delivering those services to the non-poor, or substantially increased
expenditure to increase total provision. In practice delivering health and education services
to the poor might prove as difficult politically as implementing direct redistribution of
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income and assets. The same point applies to infrastructure programmes directed to
poverty reduction. To the extent that these would reduce public investment in projects
favoured by the non-poor, especially the wealthy, they may be no easier to implement that
measures that appear superficially to be more radical.
Table 6 provides a summary of the discussion, with poverty reducing measures listed by
rows, and the three categories of countries across columns. The table indicates that for the
‘redistribution’ countries, a redistribution of current income and assets is the most effective
means of poverty reduction, and the methods to achieve this are feasible. For the
‘redistribution with growth’ countries, the measures for redistribution of current income
and assets are less feasible, but instruments to achieve the more modest goal of
redistribution of the growth increment would be feasible. Finally, most redistribution
instruments would not be feasible, or only to a limited degree, for very low-income
countries; but for these countries, a growth strategy with no redistributive mechanisms may
be the most poverty reducing path.
Table 6
Summary of feasibility of redistribution instruments by category of country
Country Category:
Redistributive
Instrument:
Redistribution of
current income +
assets (middle-income
countries)
Growth with
redistribution policies
(middle + most low-
income countries)
Growth without
redistribution policies
(very low-income
countries)
Progressive taxation Yes Yes,
for some countries
No
Transfer payments Yes Yes,
for some countries
No
Consumer subsidies Yes Yes Yes,
for some countries
Public employment
schemes
Yes Yes No
Land reform Yes,
but not always relevant
Yes Not for most countries
Education + health Yes Yes Yes
Infrastructure + public
works
Yes Yes Yes
Source: authors’ classification.
While moving from the principle of redistribution to successful implementation involves
major problems, these problems should not be exaggerated. In many countries they might
prove no more intractable than the problems associated with implementation of other
economic policies. For example, an effective orthodox monetary policy is difficult to
implement if a country is too small or underdeveloped to have a bond market. The absence
of a bond market leaves the monetary authorities unable to ‘sterilise’ foreign exchange
flows. Similarly, replacing tariffs by a value added tax would be a daunting task in a
country whose commerce was primarily through small traders. Lack of public sector
capacity would also limit the ability to carry out a range of so-called supply side policies:
privatization, ‘transparency’ mechanisms’, and decentralization of central government
service delivery (van der Hoeven and van der Geest (1999). The multilateral agencies have
recognised these constraints to adjustment programmes, and typically made the decision
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that constrained implemented represented action preferable to non-implementation. The
same argument can be made for a redistributive growth strategy: for poverty reduction and
sustainable growth, it might preferable to implement redistributive growth imperfectly than
to implement the status quo imperfectly.
Conclusion
Poverty reduction has always been a priority of development policy, albeit sometimes only
at the rhetorical level. The end of the 1990s brought increased emphasis on bringing the
benefits of growth to the poor. However, growth alone is a rather blunt instrument for
poverty reduction, since the consensus of empirical work suggests that it is distribution
neutral. Along with emphasis on poverty reduction, a shift occurred in the policy literature
towards a more favourable view of policies to redistribution income and assets. An
integration of distributional concerns and a priority on poverty reduction could be the basis
for a new policy agenda to foster both growth and equity.
This new agenda would be based on three analytical generalizations:
i) that greater distributional equality provides a favourable ‘initial condition’ for rapid
and sustainable growth;
ii) that redistribution of current income and assets, or redistribution of an economy’s
growth increment are the most effective forms of poverty reduction for most
countries; and
iii) the mechanisms to achieve the redistributions are feasible for most countries. These
generalizations imply that the new agenda could focus upon specific policies and
instruments of redistribution, with the goal of substantial reductions in urban and
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Annexe: method and sources
As shown in the text (see Table 1 and accompanying discussion), the percentage of
households in poverty, with an absolute poverty line, can be estimated using two
parameters, the poverty line as a percentage of per capita income, and the Gini coefficient.
This estimate of poverty is not sufficient for carrying out the simulations. For the
simulations, one must have an estimate of the distribution of income in the immediate
range below the poverty line. This requires an estimate of the intraquintile distribution of
income. For the vast majority of the countries, the poverty line fell in the first or second
quintile. The procedure for estimation was the following:
1) average income was calculated for the poverty quintile, and the quintile above and
below (in the case in which the poverty quintile was the first, see below);
2) within each quintile it was assumed that mean income equalled the median;25 this
assumption locates within each quintile the percentile for mean income; and
3) between each mean income, income was assumed to rise at a constant rate.
For example, the rate of increase of income between mean income in quintile one (Pm1) and
quintile two (Pm2) would be:
Pm2 = (1+r)20(Pm1)
If Pm1 were at the fourteenth percentile, the income of the twentieth percentile would be
P20 = (1+r)6(Pm1). If the poverty line lies within the first quintile, the value of r between the
first and second quintile means is used to calculate downwards to the first percentile. On
the basis of this method, the percentile for the absolute poverty line for each country can be
found by generating the income for each percentile until Pi = US$365 is reached.
Annexe Table
Country Gini Definition Reference Unit Coverage
Latin America (12) 52.2
Brazil 1995 60.1 Income Household per capita
Chile 1992 50.7 Income Person
Colombia 1991 57.2 Income Person
Costa Rica 1989 42.0 Income Person
Dom. Rep 1989 50.5 Income Person
Ecuador 1994 43.0 Expenditure Person
Guatemala 1989 59.1 Income Person
Honduras 1992 52.6 Income Person
Mexico 1992 50.3 Expenditure Household per capita
Nicaragua 1993 50.3 Expenditure Household per capita
table continues…
25 The authors wish to thank Malte Lubker for pointing out the empirical validity of this assumption for the
lowest tow quintiles.
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Country Gini Definition Reference Unit Coverage
Panama 1989 56.5 Income Person
Venezuela 1990 53.8 Income Person
N Africa and ME (5) 37.5
Algeria 1995 35.3 Expenditure Household per capita
Egypt 1991 32.0 Expenditure Household per capita
Jordan 1992 40.7 Expenditure Person
Morocco 1991 39.2 Expenditure Household per capita
Tunisia 1990 40.2 Expenditure Household per capita
Sub-Sahara (13) 48.6
Botswana 1986 54.2 Expenditure Household
Guinea 1991 46.8 Expenditure Household per capita
Kenya 1992 57.5 Expenditure Household per capita
Lesotho 1987 56.0 Expenditure Household per capita
Madagascar 1993 46.0 Expenditure Household per capita
Mauritania 1988 42.4 Expenditure Household per capita
Niger 1992 36.1 Expenditure Household per capita
Nigeria 1993 45.0 Expenditure Household per capita
Rwanda 1984 28.9 Expenditure Household per capita
Senegal 1991 53.8 Expenditure Household per capita
South Africa 1993 62.3 Income Person
Zambia 1993 46.2 Expenditure Household per capita
Zimbabwe 1990 56.8 Expenditure Household per capita
Asia, not FSU (8) 32.6
China 1995 41.5 Income Household per capita All
India 1992 32.0 Expenditure Person All
Indonesia 1996 36.5 Income Household per capita All
Nepal 1996 36.7 Expenditure Household per capita All
Pakistan 1991 31.2 Expenditure Household per capita All
Philippines 1994 42.9 Expenditure Household per capita All
Sri Lanka 1990 30.1 Expenditure Household per capita All
Thailand 1992 51.5 Income Household All
Former CP (12) 30.2
Belarus 1993 21.6 Income Household per capita All
Bulgaria 1992 30.8 Income Person All
Czech Rep 1993 26.6 Income Household per capita All
Hungary 1993 27.9 Income Household per capita All
Kazakhstan 1993 32.7 Income Household per capita All
Kyrgyzstan Rep 1993 35.3 Income Household per capita All
Lithuania 1993 33.6 Income Household per capita All
Moldova 1992 34.4 Income Household per capita All
Romania 1992 25.5 Income Household per capita All
Russian Fed 1993 31.0 Income Household per capita All
Slovak Rep 1992 27.7 Income Household All
Turkmenistan 1993 35.8 Income Household per capita All
Source: World Income Inequality Database (WIID).
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